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Abstract 21 
Previous research has demonstrated an efficiency bias in social learning whereby young 22 
children preferentially imitate the functional actions of a successful group member over an 23 
individual. Our aim in the current research was to examine whether this bias remains when 24 
actions are presented as conventional rather than instrumental. Preschool children watched 25 
videos of an individual and a group member. The individual always demonstrated a 26 
successful instrumental action and the group member an unsuccessful action that was either 27 
causally transparent or opaque. Highlighting the selective nature of social learning, children 28 
copied the group at higher rates when the demonstrated actions were causally opaque than 29 
when they were causally transparent. This research draws attention to the influence of 30 
conventional/ritual-like actions on young children’s learning choices and emphasizes the role 31 
of this orientation in the development of human-specific cumulative culture.  32 
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  41 
  No other mammal, living or extinct has successfully colonized more diverse 42 
environments than Homo sapiens. It is often posited that a key component of this success is 43 
our unique proclivity for high-level cooperation with others (Shipton & Nielsen, 2015; 44 
Whiten & Erdal, 2012). Indeed, as a species, we show strong desire for group cohesion and 45 
belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). We are also unique in our 46 
tendency and willingness to imitate (Legare & Nielsen, 2015). It could thus be reasonably 47 
expected that imitation is an adaptive solution to these social problems, such that we default 48 
to copying and accepting everything members of our social ingroup do, even when we know 49 
the actions or behaviors engaged in are instrumentally invalid or inefficient.   50 
Several studies have provided empirical support for this, demonstrating that adults 51 
and children consistently prefer to copy a majority action or conform to a majority decision 52 
(see Haun, Rekkers, & Tomasello, 2012; Haun & Tomasello, 2011). For example, in one of 53 
psychology’s classic studies, adults conformed so strongly that they openly agreed with a 54 
discernibly incorrect judgment of relative line length made by confederates (Asch, 1951). 55 
Subsequent studies have documented this same effect in young children (Corriveau & Harris, 56 
2010; Walker & Andrade, 1996). However, there may be a limit to the boundaries of this 57 
conformity bias. Our success as a species also pivots on our capacity for cumulative culture, 58 
where innovations are progressively incorporated into a population’s stock of skills and 59 
knowledge, generating ever more sophisticated repertoires via a process of ratcheting 60 
(Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009). However, as Kandler and Laland (2009) propose, an 61 
extreme bias towards following the majority limits the potential for the wide-spread adoption 62 
of innovation, thereby restricting cumulative culture (see also Carr, Kendal, & Flynn, 2015). 63 
What then are the circumstances where we choose not to follow the herd?  64 
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Seston and Kelemen (2014) found that 3 and 4 year-old children will agree with a 65 
two-person majority over an individual on the function of a novel artifact if both functions 66 
are equally plausible. However, when the majority claimed an implausible function, 4-year-67 
olds actively eschewed their opinion for the plausible minority function. Hence, while there 68 
may be a baseline majority bias in social learning endeavors, it may be trumped by a 69 
proficiency bias: The tendency to copy the individual who is most competent or proficient in 70 
a given context. Brody and Stoneman (1985) provide empirical support for this, 71 
demonstrating that 7 year-old children prefer to copy peer models who appear more 72 
competent than those who are not (see also Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013). 73 
 Recently, Wilks, Collier‐Baker, and Nielsen (2014) pitted the majority bias against 74 
the proficiency bias in young children who were shown two methods of opening a puzzle 75 
box: One performed by an individual and another by a group of three. The individual always 76 
demonstrated a successful action, while the group demonstrated either a successful or an 77 
unsuccessful action. Children copied the group – but only when the group’s actions were 78 
successful: When the group method was not successful children copied the individual (even 79 
when affiliated with the group), suggesting children prioritize proficiency over conformity. 80 
However, the actions employed by Wilks and colleagues were functional: They had a clear 81 
goal and reward. Their study therefore addressed questions regarding causally transparent, 82 
instrumental actions, but not questions of causally opaque, potentially cultural actions 83 
(Legare & Nielsen, 2015). Such actions are common in ritual and ritualized behavior 84 
(Bulbulia & Sosis, 2011; Kapitany & Nielsen, 2015; Legare & Souza, 2012; Rossano, 2012).   85 
Rituals are a causally opaque series of coherent actions featuring formality, repetition, 86 
redundancy, and stereotypy, in which performance is more important than outcome, and little 87 
variability is permitted in the action’s execution (Bulbulia & Sosis, 2011; Kapitany & 88 
Nielsen, 2015; Legare & Souza, 2012; Rappaport, 1999; Rossano, 2012).  According to the 89 
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ritual stance, when individuals perceive causally opaque actions they tend to attribute a 90 
rationale of cultural convention to the actor and the actions, rather than a rationale based on 91 
physical causation (Kapitany & Nielsen, 2015; Legare & Souza, 2012; Nielsen, Kapitany & 92 
Elkins, 2014). According to Legare and Nielsen (2015), reinforced by a willingness to rely on 93 
faith in cultural traditions over personal experience or intuition, the causal opacity and social 94 
stipulation of rituals make them ideally suited to high fidelity cultural transmission. As such, 95 
we consider that the characteristics of rituals, and causal opacity in particular, may align with 96 
the inherent motivation behind children’s imitative fidelity.  97 
Children interpret behavior instrumentally if the physical-causal basis is potentially 98 
knowable, even if it is currently unknown. Conversely, if actions cannot be understood via 99 
potentially knowable physical causal processes, children instead see them as social and rely 100 
on a conventional interpretation  Herrmann, Legare, Harris & Whitehouse, 2013; Kapitany & 101 
Nielsen, 2015; Legare, Wen, Herrmann & Whitehouse, 2015, Watson-Jones, Legare, 102 
Whitehouse & Clegg, 2014). This leads us to ask whether children will prioritize efficiency 103 
over group belonging if they are presented with an action that lacks a clear practical goal or 104 
reward? 105 
Following Wilks et al. (2014), here children saw an individual performing a 106 
successful, instrumental action and a group member performing a series of unsuccessful 107 
actions, which were either causally transparent or causally opaque. If children routinely adopt 108 
the ritual stance they will copy group actions that do not lead to a reward when the modeled 109 
actions are instrumentally opaque. Conversely, if children favor the instrumental stance 110 
(Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Legare & Souza, 2012; Nielsen, Kapitany & Elkins, 2014) they 111 
will copy the successful individual action in all conditions. There is a wealth of research 112 
showing that children have a strong tendency to copy successful group actions in practical 113 
contexts (Corriveau & Harris, 2010; Turner, Nielsen, & Collier-Baker, 2014; Wilks et al., 114 
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2014) and as such, we chose not to include a condition where children were exposed to a 115 
successful group. 116 
Method 117 
Participants 118 
 A total of 83 children participated in the experiment. Thirteen children were excluded, 119 
seven due to shyness, three due to technical issues and three due to experimenter error. Our 120 
final sample included 70 children (34 female), between 4-5 years of age (M = 56 months, SD 121 
= 179 days), split approximately evenly between the four conditions described below.  All 122 
participants were recruited from a database of parents who had previously agreed to 123 
participate in developmental research with their children. The majority of participants were 124 
Caucasian, from middle-class socioeconomic backgrounds. All participants received a small 125 
gift and certificate for participation.  126 
Apparatus and test environment 127 
 Testing was carried out in a dedicated child-friendly test room of a university-based 128 
child development research facility. The room contained a chair and a desk for the 129 
participant, which faced an 80cm flat-screen television. The child sat approximately 75cms 130 
from the television. Sessions were videotaped using a camera mounted on a tripod positioned 131 
in the right hand corner of the room (see Figure 1.) 132 
 Two distinct wooden puzzle boxes (all 20cm x 20cm x 20cm) were used throughout 133 
testing. Each box had two distinct operating mechanisms; one that opened the box and one 134 
that did not (See Table 1). Each mechanism was painted a unique color, and the remaining 135 
sides of each box were also painted a different color. The experimenter revealed a toy reward 136 
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inside the box when successfully opened (either a zebra or platypus soft plush toy). The 137 
apparatuses were concealed behind a black curtain next to the experimenter when not in use. 138 
To test for any potential relationships between levels of sociability and willingness to 139 
engage with a group's actions, parents of all children were asked to complete the Child Social 140 
Preference Scale (see Coplan, Prakash, O'Neil, & Armer, 2004). The CSPS is an 11-item 141 
questionnaire, comprising 7 items assessing shyness (e.g., “My child seems to want to play 142 
with other children, but is sometimes nervous to.”) and 4 items assessing social disinterest 143 
(e.g., “My child is just as happy to play quietly by his/herself than to play with a group of 144 
children.”). For each item, parents respond on a 5-point Likert scale to the question “How 145 
much is your child like that?” (ranging from 1 – Not at All, to 5 – A Lot).  146 
Stimulus 147 
 Wilks et al. (2014) demonstrated actions using live actors; however, due to practical 148 
constraints, video stimuli were used here. Children watched four videos two times each 149 
during the experiment. The videos ranged from 12 to 28 seconds in length, with an average 150 
length of 20.93 seconds. Each video showed footage of demonstrators acting on one of the 151 
apparatuses.  All demonstrators were Caucasian women aged 19 – 22 years and of similar 152 
height. The demonstrators were divided into an individual and a group (of three), and 153 
consistent with the individual condition, only one member of the group acted on each box. 154 
Individuals and groups were differentiated by the color of their shirt - group members wore a 155 
yellow shirt while the individual wore green. The experimenter also wore a yellow shirt to 156 
further highlight the majority group and to enhance the associated social pressure. However, 157 
children were not aligned directly with the group in any way. 158 
 Children watched each video of the individual and a group member acting on each 159 
box twice. In the videos the individual always acted on the mechanism that could open the 160 
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box, while the group member always acted on the mechanism that could not. The 161 
demonstrators faced the camera during all videos, with the individual on one side and the 162 
group on the other (see Figure 2a). This physical separation was to further enhance the 163 
distinction between the group and individual. In all videos, a close up of the model’s hands 164 
and the apparatus was shown to enhance clarity (see Figure 2b). The presentation order of the 165 
boxes and demonstrator (individual first or group member first) was randomized for each 166 
participant, as was the location of each demonstrator relative to the boxes (standing on the 167 
left or right). In each condition a different combination of videos was presented to the 168 
participant, as detailed below.  169 
In Conditions 1 and 3, children saw the individual demonstrator open the box and 170 
retrieve a toy. Viewing the model retrieving the reward emphasized the goal of the action, 171 
and as such, indicated success. As this could influence children’s behavior, Conditions 2 and 172 
4 cut the video as the model began to open each box’s door (i.e., success was only implied). 173 
Further, we did not include a condition where children saw the unsuccessful group action 174 
endorsed by other group members.  Prior research has demonstrated that group endorsement, 175 
even with live actors, has little impact on children’s imitative behavior when faced with 176 
decisions regarding the efficacy of copying specific actions (Turner et al., 2014).  Given this, 177 
we felt that examining the impact of endorsement of unsuccessful group actions was 178 
unnecessary, both from a practical perspective and theoretically as it addresses a separate 179 
research question.  180 
Condition 1 – Conventional, Explicit Success   181 
 Individual Video: The individual stepped forward and successfully manipulated the 182 
mechanism to open the box. The individual then conveyed success, exclaiming “yes”. The 183 
individual then used the handle to open the box, retrieved the toy and placed it on the table 184 
and returned to her original position.    185 
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  Group Video: The group members all stood side-by-side holding hands. This 186 
emphasized group membership in this condition. One group member stepped forward to 187 
engage with the apparatus. The group member did not open the box, but acted on it in a 188 
purposeful manner (i.e. tapping on each of the operating mechanisms). The group member 189 
then placed her hands together in a praying motion, and hummed briefly while making a short 190 
bow. The group member then placed two fingers on the front of the box and paused for 191 
approximately 2 seconds. She then turned to the other members of the group and all three 192 
repeated the pray/bow/hum action. The group member then rejoined her group and linked 193 
hands with them.  194 
Condition 2 – Conventional, Implicit Success  195 
 Individual Video: The individual stepped forward and successfully manipulated the 196 
mechanism to open the box. The individual then conveyed success, exclaiming “yes”. The 197 
individual then reached down and placed her hand on the handle to open the box, but the 198 
video is cut before the door handle is physically opened, so success is not explicitly 199 
demonstrated and the toy is not seen. 200 
 Group Video: As per Group Video in Condition One.  201 
Condition 3 – Instrumental, Explicit Success 202 
 Individual Video: As per Individual Video in Condition One.  203 
 Group Video: Group Video: The group members all stood together with their hands 204 
dropped at their sides. One group member stepped forward to engage with the apparatus. The 205 
group member tried to open the box by manipulating the non-opening mechanism and failed. 206 
The group member then raised her hands in a shrugging motion and made a confused “hmm” 207 
sound with an upward inflection. The group member then rattled the handle of the box, 208 
attempting to open it. She then turned to the other members and all three members repeated 209 
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the shrug and confused sound. The group member then rejoined her group, standing again 210 
with their hands at their sides. 211 
Condition 4 – Instrumental, Implicit Success  212 
 Individual Video: As per Individual Video in Condition Two.   213 
 Group Video: As per Group Video in Condition Three.  214 
A core aspect of ritual action is that it is causally opaque, and as such the 215 
conventional condition does not have an obvious practical outcome (i.e., it has start- end-state 216 
equivalency). Therefore, the current study did not include a condition where both groups are 217 
successful as, in terms of ritual cognition, having a ‘practical conventional condition’ would 218 
be paradoxical 219 
Procedure 220 
 After arriving at the university, the research assistant escorted children and their 221 
parent(s) to a warm up room, where the children were familiarized with their environment. 222 
During this time, parents were briefed and filled out a consent form, demographic 223 
information questionnaire and the CSPS. Once children appeared comfortable, everyone 224 
moved to an adjacent test room. 225 
 Upon entering the test room the child was asked to sit at the desk and face the 226 
television, which showed a blank screen. Children were presented with the first box, and told 227 
they could look but not touch. The box was placed in the center of the desk, approximately 228 
28cms from the child. The experimenter explained: “Here is the first box we are going to play 229 
with. See how there are two sides you can play with?” while gesturing at each side. The box 230 
was then placed behind the curtain and the experimenter said: “Let’s see how everyone in the 231 
videos plays with the box, then it will be your turn to have a go.”  232 
 A still of the first video was presented on the screen, ready to be played. Before 233 
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pressing play on the first video the demonstrator would say “See the three girls in yellow and 234 
the one girl in green. See how I have a yellow t-shirt too, they’re my friends. See how they’re 235 
all standing together. Let’s see how everyone wants to play”. The experimenter then played 236 
the first video once, then said: “Let's watch that one again” and played it a second time. The 237 
experimenter then said “Okay now let’s see how the other people play”, and then played the 238 
second video twice, with the same methodology as the first video. After completion of the 239 
videos the experimenter said: “Okay, now it’s your turn to have a go”. The experimenter then 240 
retrieved the box from behind the curtain and placed it in the same position on the desk, while 241 
saying: “Show me how you want to play”.  242 
 If children were shy or reluctant, parents and researchers gave non-directive verbal 243 
encouragement. The experimenter also provided verbal praise when each trial was completed. 244 
Four criteria dictated the end of a trial, (1) If the child successfully opened the box; (2) If the 245 
child refused to participate or touch the box after 60 seconds, or verbally expressed that they 246 
would not play; (3) If the child was unsuccessful in opening the box within 60 seconds; or (4) 247 
If the child copied the action demonstrated and then stopped interacting (at which point the 248 
experimenter would ask: “Do you want to keep playing or are you finished?” and if they 249 
responded that they were finished the trial was terminated).  250 
 The first box was placed back behind the concealing curtain and the above process 251 
was repeated for the second box. After completion of both trials the parent and child were 252 
escorted back to the warm up room where they received a certificate and small gift for 253 
participation.  254 
Coding 255 
  Scores on the CSPS were calculated for each subscale by summing the relevant items 256 
and dividing by the number of items in each subscale. Higher scores represent higher levels 257 
of shyness and social disinterest. Children's responses for each of the two boxes were coded 258 
When the Ritual Stance Trumps the Instrumental Stance 
 12 
and aggregated if they performed the group action (no = 0 and yes = 1): Thus, scores ranged 259 
between 0 (copied individual twice) and 2 (copied group twice). To evaluate whether the time 260 
children spent engaging with the apparatus varied as a function of condition (ie., whether any 261 
of the condition-based manipulations inadvertently led to differential levels of engagement 262 
with the apparatuses) we also measured the duration in seconds from when each apparatus 263 
was first touched to (a) when it was opened, or (b) when the child stopped engaging with it 264 
for more than 10s, or (c) if the 60s response period expired. A second coder blind to the study 265 
aims and hypotheses coded 20% of the sample. According to intra-class correlation 266 
coefficients, inter-rater reliability was high for both dependent variables; first action selected 267 
k = 90, p < .001 and total time engaged with apparatus, r = .88, p = <. 001.  268 
Results 269 
Due to the limited range of scores associated with copying the group action statistical 270 
analyses for this variable were conducted using logistic regression. Preliminary analyses 271 
revealed no effect of sex or box type on either of the dependent variables, thus, these factors 272 
were not analyzed further. There were no association between the Shyness or Social 273 
Disinterested subscales of the CSPS and any of the other measures of interest - they are not 274 
considered further. 275 
A linear regression revealed that neither video type (explicit vs. implicit), (β = 11.07, 276 
p = 0.092), nor demonstration type (conventional vs. instrumental), (β = -2.240, p = 0.730) 277 
statistically accounted for children’s time spent engaging with the apparatuses. Following 278 
this, the overall equation was found to be non-significant, F(2, 61) = 1.54, p = 0.222, 279 
indicating that the model did not provide good fit for the data.  280 
The mean response rates of the children across conditions are presented in Figure 3. 281 
Due to the categorical nature of the dependent variable, and the linear relationship between 282 
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levels of the DV, an ordinal logistic regression was used to determine which factors predicted 283 
children’s willingness to engage in the group action. All analyses presented met the 284 
assumption of proportional odds. Pearson’s Goodness-of-fit statistics did not fall below the 285 
threshold for rejection (p < .05). We did not find an effect of Video type (explicit vs implicit) 286 
in predicting children’s likelihood of engaging with the group action, χ2 (1) = .289, p = 0.591. 287 
However, we did find an effect of demonstration type (conventional vs. instrumental) 288 
significantly predicting children’s willingness to engage with the group action, χ2 (1) = 6.71, 289 
p = 0.010. That is, children in the conventional condition were 3.38 times more likely to copy 290 
the methods of the group than those in the instrumental condition (95% CI, -2.142 to -.297). 291 
Pseudo-R2 values range from .048 (McFadden) to to .106 (Nagelkerke). Overall the model 292 
provided good fit for the data, χ2 (1) = 7.035, p = .030. 293 
Discussion 294 
Cumulative culture relies on the high fidelity transmission of group-specific 295 
instrumental skills and social conventions to future generations (Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, 296 
Thierry, & Laland, 2012; Nielsen, 2012; Schillinger, Mesoudi, & Lycett, in press; Tennie et 297 
al., 2009; A Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009). As part of this process, 298 
children need to learn how to perform the kinds of functional tasks required for survival and 299 
success alongside the group-specific practices that function to increase cohesion and 300 
cooperation among group members (Legare & Nielsen, 2015). Children’s capacity for doing 301 
so develops early, a capacity that is context-dependent and requires early-developing 302 
flexibility in social learning (Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare et al., 2015; Watson-Jones  et al., 303 
2014). A key component of this learning is knowing when to copy and from whom. Past 304 
research has found that children favor learning from a competent individual over a member of 305 
an incompetent group (Wilks et al., 2014). This could be interpreted as evidence that the 306 
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proficiency bias trumps the majority bias in young children. However, our data paints a more 307 
nuanced picture.  308 
Children will copy a group member’s actions over an individual's so long as the group 309 
actions lead to success. Indeed, this bias is so robust that even reduced efficiency does not 310 
eradicate it (Haun, Rekers, & Tomasello, 2014; Haun, Rekkers, et al., 2012; Haun, van 311 
Leeuwen, & Edelson, 2012; Turner et al., 2014; Wilks et al., 2014), although an ultimate lack 312 
of success will  (Wilks et al., 2014). The current experiment showed that when children saw a 313 
lone individual achieve an instrumental goal and a group member who did not, children were 314 
more inclined to copy the individual than when the group member’s actions were causally 315 
opaque, even though the individual’s actions remained more causally efficacious. 316 
Importantly, under the latter circumstances, children were less inclined to copy the causally 317 
transparent over the causally opaque actions (e.g., when the actions of both models were 318 
instrumental 65% of those tested copied the individual on both trials whereas when the 319 
actions of the group member were instrumental this dropped to 33%). In essence, children 320 
showed a willingness to engage in conventional, normative behavior rather than acquire a 321 
functional skill. We argue that, consistent with the ritual stance, children interpret causally 322 
opaque actions as socially informative and normative, and will opt to copy these when they 323 
are performed by the group rather than copying explicitly successful causally transparent 324 
actions of individuals.  325 
The performance of rituals can help distinguish devoted in-group members from 326 
imposters or interlopers (Ensminger, 1997; Henrich, 2009; Irons, 2001), and facilitate group 327 
cohesion and cooperation (Ruffle & Sosis, 2007; Sosis & Ruffle, 2003; Wiltermuth & Heath, 328 
2009). Engagement in and commitment to ritual action has thus become a fundamental 329 
feature of our behavioral repertoire, something highlighted by the children in the current 330 
experiment: When faced with the choice of copying a group-oriented but failed action and an 331 
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individual-specific, functional and successful action a child’s inclination towards adopting 332 
the former was increased when the demonstrated action was made ritual-like.  333 
It is notable that in this experiment children observed actions performed by 334 
videotaped models. It is possible that their behavior would be different if the models were 335 
live actors, and if the models either remained in the test room or left (McGuigan, Gladstone 336 
& Cook, 2012; Nielsen & Blank, 2011). It is also possible that the children tested here may 337 
have responded differently if the experimenter had not conveyed affiliation with the group by 338 
wearing a t-shirt of the same color and nominating them as ‘friends’. That is, children may 339 
have felt an expectation to align themselves with the experimenter. However, if children were 340 
simply motivated to appease or affiliate with the experimenter rates of copying the group 341 
should have been similar across conventional and instrumental conditions, and they were not.  342 
In addition, Bernard, Proust, and Clément (2015) found that when cues of reliability and 343 
consensus conflict 4- and 5-year-olds prioritize consensus, whereas 6-year-olds prioritize 344 
reliability. This highlights the trajectory of children’s discerning judgements of the value of 345 
imitation models. Children older than those tested here might therefore be expected to 346 
respond differently, possibly prioritizing success over the value of copying the group (see 347 
also Oostenbroek & Over, in press). Finally, there is the possibility that different outcomes 348 
would be found if this experiment were replicated in a community where conformity and 349 
group belonging is culturally prioritized over individuality and personal expression (Mesoudi, 350 
Chang, Murray, & Lu, 2015). Exploring each of the issues outlined above is beyond the 351 
current work and hence remain important topics for future research, research that promises to 352 
further our understanding of core features of the human mind.  353 
 Children develop in environments where they are perpetually exposed to new 354 
information, both social and otherwise, and they must choose which aspects of this new 355 
information are most critical to learn. The current study adds to what is now a large corpus of 356 
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research showing children are indeed selective imitators, evaluating what to copy and from 357 
whom across a wide range of contexts (see Koenig & Sabbagh, 2013). We show here that in 358 
an instrumental context, if given a choice between an unsuccessful group action and a 359 
successful individual action, children default to the individual’s action. However, when the 360 
actions are ritualized (characterized by a normative interpretation, as per the ritual stance), 361 
children are more inclined to follow the group. The human social world is always changing 362 
and challenging, and navigating this environment successfully necessitates a flexible, 363 
adaptive response. To have a discriminating strategy for changing circumstances is an 364 
immensely valuable tool for children, and indeed adults, and likely forms a cornerstone of 365 
cumulative culture. 366 
 367 
 368 
 369 
  370 
When the Ritual Stance Trumps the Instrumental Stance 
 17 
References 371 
Asch, S. E. (1951). Effects of group pressure on the modification and distortion of 372 
judgements. In H. Guetzkow (Ed.), Groups, leadership and men. Pittsburgh, PA: 373 
Carnegie. 374 
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire forinterpersonal 375 
attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 497-376 
529. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0033-2909.117.3.497  377 
Bernard, S., Proust, J., & Clément, F. (2015). Four- to six-year-old children's sensitivity to 378 
reliability versus consensus in the endorsement of object labels. Child Development, 379 
86, 1112-1124. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12366 380 
Brody, G. H., & Stoneman, Z. (1985). Peer imitation: An examination of status and 381 
competence hypotheses. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 146, 161–170. doi: 382 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00221325.1985.9914443 383 
Bulbulia, J., & Sosis, R. (2011). Signalling theory and the evolution of religious cooperation. 384 
Religion, Brain & Behavior, 41, 363-388. doi: 385 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0048721x.2011.604508 386 
Buttelmann, D., Zmyj, N., Daum, M. M., & Carpenter, M. (2013). Selective imitation of in-387 
group over out-group members in 14-month-old infants. Child Development, 84, 422-388 
428. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01860.x 389 
Carr, K., Kendal, R. L., & Flynn, E. (2015). Imitate or innovate? Children’s innovation is 390 
influenced by the efficacy of observed behaviour. Cognition, 142, 322-332. doi: 391 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.05.005 392 
Coplan, R. J., Prakash, K., O'Neil, K., & Armer, M. (2004). Do You "Want" to Play? 393 
Distinguishing Between Conflicted Shyness and Social Disinterest in Early 394 
When the Ritual Stance Trumps the Instrumental Stance 
 18 
Childhood. Developmental psychology, 40(2), 244-258. doi: 10.1037/0012-395 
1649.40.2.244 396 
Corriveau, K. H., & Harris, P. L. (2010). Preschoolers (sometimes) defer to the majority in 397 
asking simple perceptual judgements. Developmental Psychology, 46, 437-445. doi: 398 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0017553 399 
Dean, L. G., Kendal, R. L., Schapiro, S. J., Thierry, B., & Laland, K. N. (2012). Identification 400 
of the social and cognitive processes underlying human cumulative culture. Science, 401 
335, 1114-1118. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1213969 402 
Deutsch, M., & Gerard, H. B. (1955). A study of normative and informational social 403 
influences upon individual judgment. The Journal of Abnormal and Social 404 
Psychology, 51, 629-636. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0046408 405 
Haun, D. B. M., Rekers, Y., & Tomasello, M. (2014). Children conform the the behavior of 406 
peers; other Great apes stick with what they know. Psychological Science, 25, 2160-407 
2167. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797614553235 408 
Haun, D. B. M., Rekkers, Y., & Tomasello, M. (2012). Majority-biased transmission in 409 
chimpanzees and human children, but not orangutans. Current Biology, 22, 727-731. 410 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2012.03.006 411 
Haun, D. B. M., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Conformity to peer pressure in preschool children. 412 
Child Development, 82, 1759-1767. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-413 
8624.2011.01666.x 414 
Haun, D. B. M., van Leeuwen, E. J. C., & Edelson, M. G. (2012). Majority influence in 415 
children and other animals. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 3, 61-71. doi: 416 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2012.09.003 417 
When the Ritual Stance Trumps the Instrumental Stance 
 19 
Herrmann, P. A., Legare, C. H., Harris, P. L., & Whitehouse, H. (2013). Stick to the script: 418 
The effect of witnessing multiple actors on children's imitation. Cognition, 129(3), 419 
536. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.08.010 420 
Kandler, A., & Laland, K. N. (2009). An investigation of the relationship between innovation 421 
and cultural diversity. Theoretical Population Biology, 76, 59-76. doi: 422 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2009.04.004 423 
Kapitány, R., & Nielsen, M. (2015). Adopting the ritual stance: The role of opacity and 424 
context in ritual and everyday actions. Cognition, 145, 13-29. doi: 425 
10.1016/j.cognition.2015.08.002 426 
Koenig, M. A., & Sabbagh, M. A. (2013). Selective social learning: New perspectives on 427 
learning from others. Developmental Psychology, 49, 399-403. doi: 428 
10.1037/a0031619 429 
Legare, C., & Nielsen, M. (2015). Imitation and Innovation: The Dual Engines of Cultural 430 
Learning. Trends in cognitive sciences, 19(11), 688. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2015.08.005 431 
Legare, C. H., & Souza, A. (2012). Evaluating ritual efficacy: Evidence from the 432 
supernatural. Cognition, 124, 1-15. doi: 433 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2012.03.004 434 
McGuigan, N., Gladstone, D., & Cook, L. (2012). Is the cultural transmission of irrelevant 435 
tool actions in adult humans (Homo Sapiens) best explained as the result of an 436 
evolved conformist bias? . PLoS ONE, 7, e50863. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0050863 437 
Mesoudi, A., Chang, L., Murray, K., & Lu, H. J. (2015). Higher frequency of social learning 438 
in China than in the West shows cultural variation in the dynamics of cultural 439 
evolution. Proceedings. Biological sciences / The Royal Society, 282(1798), 440 
20142209-20142209. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2014.2209 441 
When the Ritual Stance Trumps the Instrumental Stance 
 20 
Nielsen, M. (2012). Imitation, pretend play and childhood: Essential elements in the 442 
evolution of human culture? Journal of Comparative Psychology, 126, 170-181. doi: 443 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0025168 444 
Nielsen, M., Kapitany, R., & Elkins, R. (2015). The perpetuation of ritualistic actions as 445 
revealed by young children's transmission of normative behavior. Evolution and 446 
Human Behavior, 36, 191-198. doi: 447 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2014.11.002 448 
Nielsen, M., Kapitány, R., & Elkins, R. (2014). The perpetuation of ritualistic actions as 449 
revealed by young children's transmission of normative behavior. Evolution and 450 
Human Behavior. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2014.11.002 451 
Oostenbroek, J., & Over, H. (in press). Young children contrast their behavior to that of out-452 
group members. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology. doi: 453 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2015.05.009 454 
Rappaport, R. A. (1999). Ritual and religion in the making of humanity (Vol. 110.). New 455 
York;Cambridge, U.K;: Cambridge University Press. 456 
Rossano, M. J. (2012). The essential role of ritual in the transmission and reinforcement of 457 
social norms. Psychological Bulletin, 138, 529-549. doi: 458 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0027038 459 
Schillinger, K., Mesoudi, A., & Lycett, S. J. (in press). The impact of imitative versus 460 
emulative learning mechanisms on artifactual variation: implications for the evolution 461 
of material culture. Evolution and Human Behavior. doi: 462 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.04.003 463 
Seston, R., & Kelemen, D. (2014). Children’s conformity when acquiring novel conventions: 464 
The case of artifacts. Journal of Cognitive Development, 15, 569-583. doi: 465 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2013.784973 466 
When the Ritual Stance Trumps the Instrumental Stance 
 21 
Tennie, C., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Ratcheting up the ratchet: On the evolution of 467 
cumulative culture. Philosophical Transactions Of The Royal Society Of London B, 468 
364, 2405-2415. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2009.0052 469 
Turner, C. R., Nielsen, M., & Collier-Baker, E. (2014). Group actions trump normative 470 
emotional reaction in an incidental observation by young children. PLoS ONE, 9, 471 
e107375. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0114789 472 
Walker, M. B., & Andrade, M. G. (1996). Conformity in the Asch task as a function of age. 473 
The Journal of Social Psychology, 136, 372-376. doi: 474 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00224545.1996.9714014 475 
Watson-Jones, R., Whitehouse, H., & Legare, C. (2015). In-group ostracism increases high 476 
fidelity imitation in early childhood. Psychol. Sci.  477 
Wen, N. J., Herrmann, P. A., & Legare, C. H. (2015). Ritual increases children’s affiliation 478 
with in-group members. Evolution and Human Behavior. doi: 479 
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.08.002 480 
Whiten, A., & Erdal, D. (2012). The human socio-cognitive niche and its evolutionary 481 
origins. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 482 
367(1599), 2119-2129. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2012.0114 483 
Whiten, A., McGuigan, N., Marshall-Pescini, S., & Hopper, L. M. (2009). Emulation, 484 
imitation, over-imitation and the scope of culture for child and chimpanzee. 485 
Philosophical Transactions Of The Royal Society Of London B, 364, 2417-2428. doi: 486 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2009.0069 487 
Wilks, M., Collier‐Baker, E., & Nielsen, M. (2014). Preschool children favor copying a 488 
successful individual over an unsuccessful group. Developmental Science, 18(6), 489 
1014-1024. doi: 10.1111/desc.12274 490 
 491 
When the Ritual Stance Trumps the Instrumental Stance 
 22 
  492 
When the Ritual Stance Trumps the Instrumental Stance 
 23 
 493 
 494 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the experimental setup.   495 
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Figure 2. Screen shots of group demonstration (2a) and close up shown during action 498 
modeling (2b) 499 
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Figure 3.  Children’s mean preferences for selecting the group or individual as a function of condition. 513 
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Table 1. Two puzzle box apparatus and descriptions of standardized actions associated with them. 
Apparatus Successful Action Unsuccessful Action Ritual Action 
Apparatus One  
  
Acting on purple side (first 
picture), spin each disc until 
the horizontal line of the disc 
faces the lid. Use handle to 
swing door open and attain 
reward inside. 
Note: In Conditions 2 and 4 the 
video was stopped when the 
demonstrator placed her hand 
on the handle.  
Acting on pink side (second 
picture), spin each disc two 
full circles. Attempt (and fail) 
to open door using the 
handle; illustrate by rattling 
door. 
Acting on pink side (second 
picture), spin each disc 
forward and backwards using 
two fingers of each hand. 
Place two fingers on the front 
of the handle and hold for one 
second. 
Apparatus Two 
 
Acting on green side (first 
picture), lift each dowel 
consecutively from position 
and place on the table. Use 
handle to swing door open and 
attain reward inside 
Note: In Conditions 2 and 4 the 
video was stopped when the 
demonstrator placed her hand 
on the handle. 
Acting on blue side (second 
picture, attempt to lift each 
dowel consecutively from 
position; attempting (and 
failing) to lift dowel out of 
position. Rattle dowel slightly 
during the process.  Attempt 
(and fail) to open door using 
the handle; illustrate by 
rattling door. 
Acting on the blue side 
(second picture), place two 
fingers on top of each dowel 
consecutively. Place two 
fingers on the front of the 
handle and hold for one 
second. 
  
 
